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Communications______________________________________________________________________
A Technological Model to Deﬁne Access to
Electronic Clinical Records
Andrew Dalley, John Fulcher, David Bomba, Ken Lynch, and
Peter Feltham

Abstract—This communication describes a functioning model that
permits access to an electronic health record across a small number
of providers resident in an Australian regional setting. Design criteria
designated that provider access rights were to be assignable, revokable,
transportable, and informable.
Index Terms—Clinical knowledge architecture, consent, electronic
health record (EHR), health-care document management, knowledge
sharing between different healthcare groups, patient access, unique
patient identiﬁer (UPI), security, USB I-key.

I. BACKGROUND
There are around 500 diabetes patients registered with the Illawarra
Division of General Practice (IDGP), who require regular consultations with their physicians [general practitioners (GPs)]. In order to
facilitate the movement of these patients within the region’s primary
care health system, a mechanism whereby patients could remotely access their electronic health records (EHRs) was developed. In order to
maintain continuity of informed care, patients were deemed to have the
right to select which GPs, of those previously registered in the IDGP
Diabetes Program, could be given permission to access their record.
Remote, secure, and patient—accredited access to a central data repository was the chosen methodology.
The centralized diabetes database was updated on a weekly basis,
using an automated uploading process of clinical diabetes-related information extracted from the medical director (MD) clinical software
program running on the GPs’ computers. Moreover, both patients and
GPs successfully accessed the patient record via the IDGP website.
II. FIELD TRIAL
In order to test the validity of our technological model, we undertook a ﬁeld trial involving 20 patients and their associated (6) GPs [1].
For the purposes of the trial, access was deemed to have four characteristics, namely: 1) assignable, 2) revokable, 3) transportable, and
4) informable. These characteristics mean that access could be both
granted and revoked by the patient, and be available to a provider (GP)
irrespective of where the patient was physically located.
Each GP and patient were matched with a 1024-bit randomly
generated number. This number was subsequently installed on patient
or practitioner transportable storage devices (USB I-Keys/memory

sticks), and concurrently tabulated in patient and provider tables as
the unique patient/provider identiﬁer (UPI). GP I-Keys stored a single
1024-bit randomly generated UPI; patients’ I-Keys stored multiple
identiﬁers, these being a web server ID, a variable number of GP
practice IDs (which increased as patients moved between practices),
together with a local patient ID generated by the GPs desktop MD
program.
The GP was prompted to insert their I-Key whenever their practice
computer booted up. The GP’s user identiﬁer was stored in the computer’s memory until required by the (automatic, periodic) uploading
process. The software then went into background mode. A valid GP
I-Key deﬁned authorization for the GP to access the web-based patient
record. Subsequent insertion of a valid patient I-Key activated that access to the speciﬁc patient record. This process replaced the existing
user name/password access method, which permitted only one designated GP to ever access a given patient record. (However, patients
were granted the right to access their own record externally on a user
name/password basis.)
Whenever a patient I-Key was detected, a check was performed to
determine whether that particular patient I-Key had previously been
seen at this surgery. This was technically straightforward as both the
patient’s local ID and the recruiting medical practice’s ID were stored
on the I-Key. If the local ID could not be found on the I-Key, then a
secure connection to the server was opened, and a transaction authorized using the GP’s I-Key (still residing in memory from its earlier
insertion), together with the current patient I-Key. If the two I-Keys
were veriﬁed by the IDGP web server, it then transferred the patient’s
demographic record to the GP’s computer. The local ID of this patient
record was stored on the I-Key along with that practice’s ID number,
thus constituting a valid ID pair.
An on-screen prompt invited the GP to check whether any information had been added to the patient’s record by other providers. If the
GP accepted this invitation, the patient inserted their I-Key, thus completing the authorization process. A secure connection had, thereby,
been established. The presence of new clinical information opened a
web browser window allowing the clinician to view the patient’s diabetes record on-line.
In the event of a communications failure, the GP was reliant on their
existing clinical records. If the client software was unable to access the
central server for uploading of new data, the information was stored,
then forwarded at the next scheduled upload communication. The only
impact on system functionality would be that information currently
stored on the IDGP central database was unavailable for access through
a web interface for the duration of the communications failure.

III. TECHNOLOGICAL MODEL
The technological model comprised the following:
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1) a Microsoft SQL 7.0 database which holds the clinical records
of the 20 participating patients;
2) an Apache 4.0 Web Server;
3) Rainbow I-Keys to store the 1024-bit identiﬁer and less sophisticated IDs derived from the local surgery ID, as well as MD
identiﬁers on the local MD database;
4) a user interface on the GP’s computer, activated by the correct
insertion of I-Keys into its USB port;
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5) a program to interrogate the GPs’ computers for previously
unutilized clinical information on trial patients and to transfer it
to the IDGP server;
6) a Java applet situated on the trial’s web-based login page to read
information from the I-Keys;
7) provider and patient websites displaying the patient record and
aggregated clinical data extracted from interrogation of all GP
computers.
IV. SYSTEM SECURITY
The information stored on the I-Keys was protected (in the I-Key
hardware) by a master password. I-Keys were only used to authenticate
to the server; they performed no off-line function in our system.
The system logs website logins, website page views, and data uploads. Properly monitored, this enables an administrator to respond to
inappropriate system usage.
V. MODEL DEPENDENCIES
Our technological model has a number of critical dependencies, as
follows.
1) Smart device—Rainbow Technologies provided a USB I-Key
Application Programming Interface [2], which was used in conjunction with C++ libraries to build custom software to perform
functions such as uploading the UPI and formatting the I-Key.
2) Accreditation of users—A simple manual method of accreditation of users was utilized given the small number of participants
[3]. IDGP authorized the GPs, all members of the organization,
as known and trusted persons, while the GP’s identiﬁed the patients as known and trusted persons. The patients were then authorized by IDGP administrative staff in that a person with an
identiﬁed name vouched for by a trusted agent (the GP) was associated with a numeric identiﬁer, which itself was associated
with an electronic token (I-Key).
3) Authentication—Once the users were accredited and details
stored in the IDGP database, this then became the central

authentication database. All accesses to web pages were authorized by the web server utilizing this database.
4) Lost keys—During the project, no patients demised. In the
event of a participant losing a key, the identifying number was
marked as “revoked” on the central database. The number was
not deleted so that it would be possible to track any future use
of the missing key.
5) Clinical software—A further dependency was the MD clinical
software. An independent clinical program was developed to
store and download data in the case that a particular GP did not
possess MD, however, this situation did not arise.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are two well-recognized core functions for smart tokens in the
medical environment. The ﬁrst is to act as a repository for clinical information. The second is to act as an identiﬁer linking a card or token to a
clinical record. This project focused on a third function—a smart token
acting as a secure remote access mechanism to a patient’s centrally
stored clinical information. The use of codependant I-Keys provided a
technically satisfactory means by which patients could grant contemporaneous access, revoke it, and transfer it to other accredited providers
whose identity is known to the patient. This research is consistent with
the Commonwealth of Australia’s EHR initiatives involving UPIs, national practitioner authorization, and standard code sets. It provides the
Australian health consumer with the possibility of consulting a range
of providers, all of whom may have access to that consumer’s health
record wherever and whenever the patient (consumer) chooses.
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